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Returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) present a dilemma for the European 
Union (EU) and member state governments. Current policy ranges from repatriation, 
prosecution, discouragement, or even refusal of re-entry of these returnees. Attack-focused 
language used in such policies indicates that physical threat is the foremost concern of the 
EU. However, in light of empirical data on violent attacks committed by returnees, there is 
a mismatch between actual threat and the supranational organization’s and member states’ 
response. I suggest that other factors, other than simply physical security, are driving the 
policy-making process. I argue that the responses of Western European states and the EU 
as a whole are driven by a sense of infringement upon the identity and agency of the 
organization—in other words, the return of foreign fighters represents an attack on the 
ontological security experienced by the state. 
In this paper, I first provide an overview of the foreign fighter phenomenon, 
describing why many of those returning from Syria and Iraq are regarded as foreign 
terrorist fighters, thus eliciting a stronger response from home governments. I then 
outline the EU’s reaction, highlighting the relationship between EU- and member state-
level responses. Third, I provide data demonstrating the incongruity between policy 
language and tangible threat. Finally, I hypothesize that the EU has labeled the return of 
FTFs an existential security threat that may generate ontological insecurity, or a sense of 
damaged identity, in the EU, and that this designation has justified policy responses to 
this group. The recognition of ontological insecurity as one result of the return of FTFs is 
a crucial factor in a comprehensive perception of EU security responses, and this paper 
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 The flow of radicalized extremists returning to their home countries after fighting 
in conflict zones in Syria, Iraq, and some surrounding Middle Eastern states remains an 
issue of international importance. In turn, state responses to these returning foreign 
terrorist fighters (FTFs) have long been evolving. A resurgence in the number of fighters 
returning to their countries of origin has been seen in the past several years, renewing the 
debate over policy and bringing into question the efficacy and appropriateness of existing 
measures that attempt to repatriate, prosecute, discourage, or even refuse re-entry of 
fighters returning from conflict zones. 
Policy responses of home states are reactions to the potential threat posed by the 
return of FTFs. This paper will examine the physical threat these individuals pose to their 
Western European home states, and the effects this threat perception has on policy-making 
in these countries. I focus on the supranational institution of the EU and its member states, 
which include most of Western, Northern, and Eastern Europe.1 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK will be 
highlighted in policy and returnee data analysis. While EU member states are not the sole 
countries managing the challenges of returning FTFs, the EU is the focus of most foreign 
fighter data collection because of its relatively high concentration of returning FTFs and its 
distinguishable policy decisions that have set a precedent for other Western2 nations in 
their pursuit of effective, manageable policy in response to the flow of returnees. 
Though the phenomenon of foreign fighting—the migration of individuals with the 
goal of partaking in violent conflict with a non-State group outside of their home country, 
and often motivated by ideology, religion, affiliation, etc.3—is not novel, it has become a 
subject of heightened international attention since 2011, with academics and security 
 
1 The United Kingdom (UK) formally withdrew from this union at the beginning of 2020, but for the purposes of the 
data presented in this study, the UK will be referred to as part of the EU. 
2 The term “Western” refers to the somewhat subjective distinguishment between the cultures and societies of the 
Western and Eastern hemispheres, roughly. Typically, the West refers to the United States, Canada, Western Europe 
and in some cases, Latin and South America. Importantly, the Western world remains predominantly Christian 
(according to Pew Research Center data on the Regional Distribution of Christians published on December 19, 
2011), and is distinct from the “East” and the Arab and African spheres. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Foreign Terrorist Fighters Manual for Judicial Training Institutes 
South-Eastern Europe, 3. 
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officials drawing comparisons from a multitude of historical instances of the same trend in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia, for example.4 Prior to that year, before 
the Arab Spring and Syrian conflict prompted a modern wave of foreign fighting, the 
majority of Western citizens were largely unaware of the recent happenings in this theater. 
With this new general awareness of conflict in the Middle East also came a more specific 
interest in organizations such as the Islamic State (commonly known as ISIL or ISIS, which 
officially declared a Caliphate, a rightfully claimed and historically meaningful territory 
ruled by and for Muslims, in June 2014)5 by some Western and Northern Europeans6 (herein 
referred to as simply “Western Europeans”), leading to a dramatic and steady escalation in 
the number of citizens of Western countries leaving their home states to fight with these 
groups often designated by those states as terrorist organizations. 
Estimates of the numbers of radicalized men and women who travel to other 
countries to carry out jihad, or military action with the objective of expanding or defending 
the religion, values, and practices of Islam, are becoming increasingly accurate, as more 
data is obtained regarding fighters’ travel to and from conflict zones, as well as death 
records and MIA notices.7 Estimates of the number of Western European citizens involved 
in foreign fighting between 2014 and 2020 range from 14% (5684 fighters)8 to almost 20%9 
of the 25,000-40,000 total foreign fighters who traveled to Iraq and Syria from over 100 
countries since 2011.10,11 The three largest European countries supplied the greatest number 
of European fighters, with 1,200 coming from France and 500-600 coming from both 
Germany and the United Kingdom; however, Belgium and Denmark produced the most 
fighters compared to their population size: 40 and 27 per million population, respectively.12 
 
4 Schmid and Tinnes, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective, 5 
5 Schmid and Tinnes, 7 
6 The term “Western Europe” encompasses the countries of Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. “Northern Europe” includes Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
and Western Europe. (Enjolras, Bernard. 2018. Region Report Northern and Western Europe. Oslo: Institute for 
Social Research, Norway.)  
7 Cook, Understanding Jihad, 2. 
8 Pokalova, Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters, 6. 
9 Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.” 
10 Van Ginkel and Entenmann, The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union, 3. 
11 Schmid and Tinnes, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspective, 6. 
12 Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.” 
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Approximately 6-23% of EU citizen foreign fighters are converts to Islam.13 The Middle East 
region has been the leading supplier of foreign fighters in this conflict, with as many as 
11,000 individuals traveling between countries in the area. Much of the additional data 
collected regarding the personal profiles of FTFs have been inconclusive due to the diverse, 
dissimilar backgrounds of these individuals.14 
Analysis of the threat posed by FTFs upon their return is typically addressed by 
governments in a manner similar to that of more general counterterrorism efforts. 
Centered around the four pillars of preventing, protecting, pursuing, and responding,15 the 
goal is to defend citizens and infrastructure from physical attack. Indeed, in dealing with 
returning FTFs, most of the focus is placed on the tangible threat of physical attack. This is 
based largely on the known history of FTFs committing acts of violence both on the 
battlefield and in terrorist attacks against the countries to which they traveled. There is 
subsequent concern in home governments that this violent training will continue to be 
utilized when FTFs return to non-combatant society.16 However, the violence committed 
abroad can be described as “soldiers on the battlefield,” which is separate from non-
combatant society, and thus it is yet unclear whether this physical violence translates into 
an equivalent threat in home countries.  
While concerns surrounding physical attack certainly resonate, there is an apparent 
overreaction by governments to this potential threat which will be outlined in this paper. I 
will examine the rationale for focusing on the physical threat posed by returning fighters 
by analyzing the priorities mentioned and verbiage used in both EU-level and member 
state-level policy regarding the handling of the return of FTFs. Protection against violence 
in non-combatant society is central to such policy, but, as I will establish, the policies which 
have been developed are disproportionate to the prevalence of physical attack perpetrated 
by returned FTFs. I demonstrate that there are other underlying concerns, perhaps more 
influential than the threat of physical attack, upon which policy is built. Specifically, this 
 
13 Van Ginkel and Entenmann, 4. 
14 Van Ginkel and Entenmann, 4. 
15 Van Ginkel and Entenmann, 5. 
16 Bakker and van Zuijdewijn, Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Western Europe, 8. 
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study explores the extent to which ontological insecurity, or a sense of threatened identity, 
may be generated in home countries by the return of foreign terrorist fighters and how this 
insecurity has shaped national security policy responses. I hypothesize that the responses 
of Western European states and the EU as a whole are driven partly by a sense of 
infringement upon the identity and agency of the state—in other words, the return of 
foreign fighters represents an attack on the ontological security experienced by the state. 
To demonstrate that a sense of ontological insecurity, or violated identity, is one 
motivator for policy passed by both state governments and the EU, the empirical basis upon 
which policy is built will be examined in-depth, specifically addressing discrepancies 
between the language used to describe the danger of returning FTFs and the extent of 
attacks actually carried out. This is certainly not to say that there exists no physical threat 
to the safety of people and infrastructure in the individual’s home country. Rather, I am 
simply examining the empirical justification for these policies in the past few years as the 
flow of returnees was steady and international visibility of returnees was growing. I will 
then include a discussion of ontological security, as well as how this concept might be used 
to explain a state’s policies. Effectively investigating the FTF phenomenon and resulting 
policies from an ontological security perspective may provide insight into more nuanced, 
successful strategies for addressing future challenges of returning FTFs. 
 
The Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon 
 Though the recent surge of returning foreign terrorist fighters has reinvigorated 
European society’s concern over the threat these radicalized17 individuals pose to their 
home countries, the phenomenon of foreign fighting and apprehension surrounding the 
return of these unique combatants is not new. In this section, to more fully explain the 
scope of the current conflict involving the return of mostly Islamic FTFs, I present a brief 
overview of recent history in order to clarify the genesis of Islamic extremist groups. 
 
 
17 “Radicalization” is defined as the process or progression by which individuals become indoctrinated into 
extremist beliefs, ideology, viewpoints, etc. (However, just like “terrorism,” there is no universally accepted 
definition.) (Neumann, Peter R. 2013. “The trouble with radicalization.” International Affairs 873-93.) 
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Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan 
The Soviet conflict in Afghanistan in the early 1980s initiated what is considered the 
first wave of modern Islamist foreign fighting.18 Kabul hosted a proxy communist 
government at the time, and the Soviet Union invaded the country to preserve its holding 
in 1979. When the issue of defending the Muslim country and its values from foreign 
invaders was portrayed to sympathizers as a humanitarian conflict, volunteers from nearby 
countries, initially backed by Islamic charities and later supported and trained by Pakistani 
madrassas (religious schools), traveled to assist refugees displaced by the crisis.19,20 The 
legitimacy and purpose of these volunteers were not questioned, since their motivation 
appeared to be one of altruism, but as it became clear that the initial Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was becoming an occupation, volunteer recruitment21 angled more toward 
those who would help in the fight22 against the invaders, deemed non-believers or infidels, 
over those who desired to provide humanitarian aid in the country. 
 Networks of fighters, or mujahideen, from neighboring nations developed quickly 
under active leaders, most of whom had received extensive education in Islamic teachings 
and practices at institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jordan, and had previously been 
involved in some way in paramilitary action.23 These leaders amassed a following by 
publishing recruitment material stressing the importance of defending one’s Muslim family 
and lands. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a prominent facilitator of anti-Soviet jihad, asserted 
that fighting was “incumbent upon every Muslim today” and that they must “march forward 
to jihad to aid their Muslim brothers” not only in Afghanistan but “in every place in need.”24 
This aggressive rhetoric encompassed the view of many budding jihadists at the time, and 
proliferation of this mindset was made possible by Islamic religious leaders and foreign 
support alike.  
 
18 Holmer and Shtuni, Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative, 3. 
19 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 3. 
20 Hegghammer, The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters, 62. 
21 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 1-2. 
22 This fight is called jihad, an Arabic word that translates to “struggle” or “striving” towards a worthy goal, but 
which has been applied to religiously motivated violence. 
23 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 4. 
24 Quotation from a letter to Azzam from Abdullah Nassah al Waan. Found in Azzam, “Defense of the Muslim 
Lands.” 
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 When Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in early 1989, the call to “every place 
in need” resonated more immediately with fighters who had traveled to Afghanistan to 
participate in the struggle. More than 20,000 foreign fighters had arrived during the decade 
of conflict, most of whom were considered “Arab Afghans,” meaning that they hailed from 
other countries in the Middle East.25 The true impact of these foreign fighters in 
Afghanistan was low, simply because of the “amateurishness” of these fighters and their 
general disregard for Afghan soldiers and military practices; they instead focused on the 
principles of jihad.26 However, their relatively minimal experience in battle and supporting 
roles in the conflict were sufficient to provide new skills, contacts, and motivation to 
proliferate the struggle for jihad in future conflicts.27 No longer was the fighting and 
recruitment contained within the borders of Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. 
Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq  
Many of those who chose to continue fighting moved on to Bosnia, where religious 
issues between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims erupted in armed conflict 
in early 1992.28 The humanitarian angle was once again exploited by leaders of the 
movement in order to raise funds for a more “socially acceptable” reason, so as not to alarm 
the international community—namely the US and EU—to whom a humanitarian cause of 
conflict is more in line with standards of necessary intervention by Western states (a 
principle known as liberal imperialism, a core ideal of the EU).29 There were believed to 
have been anywhere between 1,000 and 2,000 foreign fighters in Bosnia around this time.30 
Following this, war broke out in Chechnya in late 1994. The majority of foreign fighters who 
traveled to Chechnya had participated in the wars in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, or Bosnia, 
evidence that the proliferation of foreign fighting was a means of spreading jihad 
internationally.31  
 
25 Atteridge, Foreign Fighters Post Conflict, 8. 
26 Atteridge, 9. 
27 Hegghammer, The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters, 63. 
28 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 6. 
29 Cooper, “The new liberal imperialism.”  
30 Hegghammer, The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters, 61. 
31 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 11. 
 8 
The actions in the United States on September 11, 2001 by terrorist group al Qaeda—
which had been growing in number and strength since around 1988—were seen by 
members as a zenith of violent jihad and used to recruit more individuals into the cause. 
The resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq waged by the US (the latter of which attracted 
between 4,000 and 5,000 foreigners)32 exacerbated anti-Western sentiment in these 
fighters and encouraged more radicalized youth to join the jihadist crusade. The web of 
foreign fighters was continuing to grow, as veterans and new soldiers similarly heeded the 
call to arms that was becoming increasingly louder with the rise of communications 
technology. The next large-scale conflict, beginning in Syria in 2011, saw the incitement of 
the largest number of foreign fighters yet, topping 35,000 throughout the course of the 
prolonged conflict.33 
 
ISIS and Foreign Fighting: “There is no jihad without hijrah” 
 The advent of a new category of foreign fighters—foreign terrorist fighters—resulted 
from the rise of the latest global terrorism threat born out of similar regional conflict: the 
Islamic State. The extreme nature of this al Qaeda derivative earned it a reputation of 
unwavering intensity and brutality in line with its grandiose goal of establishing a 
recognized Caliphate, or Islamic empire, under the rule of the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi.34 The group was designated a terrorist organization by the US Department of 
State in late 2004.35 After the Arab Spring in March 2011 and subsequent military action to 
regain government control over the country, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(known by the acronym ISIL, or ISIS) became a powerful force opposing the Syrian army 
by 2014. ISIS took over territory in the region—nearly one-third of Syria and almost half of 
Iraq by 201536—in order to build their Caliphate, and utilized this tangible strength as a 
recruitment tool. Estimates suggest that by the peak of ISIS’s existence, close to 40,000 
foreigners from over 120 countries traveled to the area to join and aid in efforts to seize 
 
32 Donnelly, 17. 
33 Donnelly, 24. 
34 Al Manasir and Vuçaj, “To what extent does ISIS mark a new stage in the development of Salafi-jihadism?” v. 
35 US Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
36 Wilson Center, “Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State.” 
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unified, controlled territory and governing power amidst crumbling state governments in 
Syria and more broadly in the Middle East.37,38 Approximately 80% of this total number of 
foreign fighters joined ISIS during their time in Syria (around 32,000 individuals).39 Up to 
4,761 were women, and up to 4,640 were minors, a larger number than was seen in previous 
conflicts.40 
Rather than focusing on driving infidels out of Muslim countries as previous non-
State groups had done, ISIS promoted the ideology of jihad through hijra[h], translated as 
“migration,” for a more cohesive yet expansive Muslim state.41 ISIS’ manipulation of this 
word, which traditionally refers to the journey of the Prophet Muhammed from Mecca to 
Medina, further enunciated their sinister goals and disregard for Muslim values.42 A direct 
call to action was sent across the world in the form of videos, magazines, and other 
propaganda with the goal of attracting foreign fighters. One featured article in the radical 
magazine Dabiq proclaimed, “There is no life without jihad, and there is no jihad without 
hijrah,” condemning those who did not heed the “holy” call.43,44 This reenergized 
movement of volunteer fighters traveling specifically to join a terrorist group—as opposed 
to fighting in a foreign conflict with which one has some personal or religious connection, 
as was the case in past encounters—prompted the creation of a more specific term: foreign 
terrorist fighters. 
A formal definition of foreign terrorist fighters is the subject of legal debate, much 
like the word terrorism itself. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, published 
in September 2014, defines these individuals as those “who travel to a state other than their 
states of residence…for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or 
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training.”45 The EU 
recognizes this definition as well. As such, anyone associated with ISIS during this period 
 
37 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 23. 
38 Holmer and Shtuni, Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative, 2. 
39 Basit, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria – Why So Many?” 4.   
40 Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,” 3. 
41 Waldeck, The ideology of ISIS –a motivation for Europeans to become foreign fighters? 57. 
42 Uberman and Shay, “Hijrah According to the Islamic State: An Analysis of Dabiq,” 16. 
43 Dabiq, “There Is No Life without Jihād and There Is No Jihād without Hijrah,” 31. 
44 Waldeck, The ideology of ISIS –a motivation for Europeans to become foreign fighters? 59. 
45 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 2178,” 2. 
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and who traveled to physically join the Caliphate would be considered part of this category. 
Likewise, when these individuals return to their country of residence, they are deemed 
returning foreign terrorist fighters, herein referred to as “returning FTFs” or simply 
“returnees.” 
In addition to providing the terrorist organization with leverage and recruitment 
power, the vast territory of ISIS opened it up to attack by the US and other countries, 
leading fairly quickly to its downfall and loss of almost all territory.46 Even before the 
group’s declared defeat in early 2019,47 fighters were returning to their home countries for 
numerous reasons, including (1) true defection or total disengagement from the group, and 
(2) continued engagement and a motivation to resume terrorist operations in the home 
country.48 In response to this influx of FTFs, the European Union, as well as other 
international organizations and countries, quickly developed policies regarding their 
return that have continued evolving for the past few years; these policies and the reasoning 
behind them will be unpacked in the following section. 
Finally, Figure 1 contains numerical data on the return of FTFs to individual 
European Union member countries. According to a report released in October 2017 by The 
Soufan Group, a global security consultancy headquartered in New York City, official 
estimates of returning FTFs are updated frequently as data streams in from countries 
around the world, with the general trend being a constant increase in returnees to their 
home countries between 2015 and early 2016, at which point the flow slowed 
significantly.49,50 Collectively, the European Commission’s Radicalization Awareness 
Network (RAN) and other organizations estimated that around 30% of all European Union 
citizen fighters had returned to their respective countries by July 2017, or around 1500 
individuals.51 However, though the movement of returnees has subsided over the past few 
 
46 Donnelly, Foreign Fighters in History, 24. 
47 Wilson Center, “Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State.” 
48 Speckhard, Yayla and Shajkovci, “Defected from ISIS or Simply Returned, and For How Long?” 2. 
49 Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate, 9. 
50 Radicalisation Awareness Network, Responses to Returnees, 15. 
51 Van Ginkel and Entenmann, The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union, 3. 3 
 11 
years, concern and uncertainty surrounding these fighters’ motivations and abilities remain 
high. 
 
EU Member State Total FTFs Returned FTFs % of Total FTFs 
Who Have 
Returned** 
Austria 296 90 30.4% 
Belgium 528 ≥ 123 23.3% 
Bulgaria < 10 0 0.0% 
Denmark ≥ 145 67 46.2% 
Finland ≥ 80 43 53.8% 
France 1910 302 15.8% 
Germany ≥ 915 300 32.8% 
Italy 110 13 11.8% 
Netherlands 280 50 17.9% 
Spain 204 30 14.7% 
Sweden 300 106 35.3% 
UK* 850 425 50% 
EU Total** ≥ 5600 ≥ 1500 ≥ 26.8% 
Average 469 129 27.7% 
Figure 1. EU countries, the estimated number of citizens who traveled to Syria and/or Iraq, the number who 
have returned, & the percentage of returnees out of total FTFs. All data were accumulated by The Soufan 
Group & chosen to be presented in this paper because of the recency of reporting.** Dates of reporting 
returnees all fall between 09/2016 & 10/2017, with the exception of Bulgaria which was reported in 09/2015.
52
 
*The United Kingdom is included in these estimates because the country was a member of the EU during the 
period in which these numbers were reported. 
**Total figures for the European Union & all percentages were calculated by the author. 
 
The European Union and Returning FTFs  
In this section, I give an overview of the structure of European Union governance 
and provide a breakdown of the units responsible for law and policy making, particularly 
 
52 Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate, 12-13. 
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those related to counterterrorism efforts and regulations regarding returning FTFs. 
Following this, I explore legislation on the handling of returnees with a particular interest 
in the language used within the legislative text itself. Here I illustrate that the EU displays 
a disproportionate focus on physical attack by juxtaposing the language in these policies 
with data on the actual prevalence of physical attack—physical damage done to 
infrastructure or people—perpetrated by foreign fighters who have returned from conflict 
areas abroad. 
 
European Union Governance Structure 
The European Union is a supranational governing body to which 27 Western and 
Eastern European member countries belong.53 The foundation of the EU is individual 
member-state sovereignty with a blurring of internal borders between member states. 
Members retain autonomy while acknowledging that sharing in decision-making processes 
through a common institution sustains benefits and provides advantages to the union as a 
whole. Some matters of common interest to member states are delegated to this 
overarching governance structure, and decision-making at this level affects each state. 
Several institutions operate in tandem as an organized governing structure, including the 
European Parliament, whose delegates are directly elected by the citizens of each member 
country; the European Council, which consists of members’ Heads of State and sets broad 
direction for EU policy; the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of 
Ministers because it is comprised of ministers from each state), in which countries may 
defend their own interests and is, along with Parliament, the main decision-making body 
of the EU; and the European Commission, which represents the interests of the EU as a 
“politically independent executive arm.”54,55 Typically the decision-making process flows 
such that the European Commission proposes new legislation, the European Parliament 
and Council passes these regulations, and member states are responsible for implementing 
 
53 Including the UK increases the total number of member states to 28. 
54 “The European Union: What It Is and What It Does,” 10. 
55 European Union, “European Commission.”  
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and adhering to them.56 Overall, some political areas are under the domain of each member 
state, while others are under the authority of EU supranational law-making. 
Another key piece of the governance structure of the EU is the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. This body ensures the uniform application and implementation of 
supranational EU laws and court rulings in each member state, and settles disputes 
between members and EU institutions.57 The Court upholds the principle of precedence, 
or supremacy, of EU law over national law when the two conflict.58 This principle highlights 
the influence the EU possesses over member states, while at the same time allowing all 
states’ input to be validated and considered in the decision-making process. In some 
realms, though, the EU largely defers to the sovereignty of member states. National security 
is one such realm in which states pass their own legislation, but only when issues pertain 
more at the member state level as opposed to sweeping issues that encompass the EU as a 
whole, such as counterterrorism. 
An important concept when discussing the ideology and international role held by 
the EU is “normative power Europe” (NPE). This term refers to the “power over opinion” or 
“ideological power” evidenced in the EU’s “ability to project its core values beyond its 
borders.”59,60 According to this idea, the EU has an impact on “what is considered 
appropriate behavior by other actors” across the world.61 In other words, it is the EU’s 
capability to “shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” that allows the 
organization to remain an influential actor.62 Rosecrance, as quoted by Manners, states that 
it is paradoxical that the “continent which once ruled the world through the physical 
impositions of imperialism” today sets global standards through its normative power of 
ideology.63 Recently, NPE has become a topic of debate in the field of international 
relations, due partly to the question of whether there are double standards in EU policy-
 
56 “The European Union: What It Is and What It Does,” 10. 
57 European Union, “Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).”  
58 EUR-Lex, “Primacy of EU Law.” 
59 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 239. 
60 Scheipers and Sicurelli, “Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?” 435. 
61 Manners and Diez, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe,” 175. 
62 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 239. 
63 Manners, 238. 
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making versus their imposition of standards on other actors.64 Regardless, EU-level foreign 
policy is seen to assert a standard-setting identity and continually reestablishes the 
organization’s place as a dominant actor in the international arena.  
In NPE, there is an emphasis on “liberal imperialism” or “liberal internationalism” 
that “calls for…a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention,” an ideological emphasis 
which was exploited by jihadist leaders at the beginning of the aforementioned Middle 
Eastern regional conflicts.65 This concept, as argued by Robert Cooper, states that 
intervention, whether physical or ideological, has replaced colonization as a way for 
Western states to deal with governmental weakness or instability outside of their borders.66 
In the modern world, this concept manifested in the EU’s campaign for the abolition of the 
death penalty worldwide beginning heavily in the 1980s.67 The EU sought to globally 
normalize what to member states was already considered a humanitarian baseline. Thus, it 
is evident why “humanitarian issues” in Afghanistan and Bosnia to which foreign fighters 
were responding would not necessarily ring alarm bells, as such action did not contradict 
the ideals of NPE. However, this status as a champion of human rights introduces an 
interesting and potentially contradictory distinguishment when juxtaposed with current 
policy regarding the treatment of returning FTFs, as addressed later in this section. 
Though member states have the “front-line responsibility” for their own security, 
“EU cooperation is essential” in the fight against terrorism.68 European Union member 
states have developed their own protocols for and offices in charge of proposing and 
passing policy addressing the return of foreign fighters. Most states have counterterrorism 
units, along with domestic law enforcement organizations, that address the threat of 
terrorism both within their borders and across national borders in Europe. However, 
terrorism is a unique threat in the way it defies borders and can affect each country equally 
yet somewhat haphazardly, meaning that it can be difficult to predict or anticipate which 
states may be victimized by terrorism and when, further supporting the case for an 
 
64 Manners and Diez, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe,” 173. 
65 Cooper, “The new liberal imperialism.” 
66 Cooper, “The new liberal imperialism.” 
67 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 245. 
68 Migration and Home Affairs, “Counter terrorism and radicalisation.” 
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overarching authority.69 Because of this cross-border aspect, the EU Parliament and 
Council can adopt common minimum regulations that align with the four pillars of 
prevention, protection, pursuit, and response, based on Article 83 of the 2012 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).70 These pillars, adopted in 2005, were the 
primary goals of improved EU counterterrorism strategy. Prevention refers to the need to 
address the causes of radicalization and recruitment; protection prioritizes the safety of 
citizens and infrastructure within the EU; pursuit focuses on the fight against terrorism 
across borders; and response aims to improve reactionary capabilities should an attack 
occur.71  
Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union qualifies this provision, though, by 
stating that “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,” and 
Article 72 of the TFEU affirms this as well.72 Thus, while the EU can act in solidarity with 
member states (stated in Article 222 of the TFEU)73, matters of national security, like 
terrorism, are ultimately a state-level concern. European Union-level guidelines or 
regulations address more big-picture objectives rather than interfering in the operations of 
domestic law enforcement and criminal justice systems. Often, legislation regarding 
criminalization and prosecution of terrorists is most likely to differ between countries, 
based on other criminal justice practices already in place. For example, in French terrorism 
trials, authorities are able to use special investigative and intelligence gathering techniques 
in addition to those employed in typical criminal cases, and judges who specialize in 
terrorism reside over the trial and investigation.74 The use of unique investigative 
techniques in terrorism trials is similar in some other states, such as Belgium, but not all.75 
Such overarching international security issues in which the EU as a whole is involved 
are handled by The Common Security and Defense Policy, with instruments like the EU 
 
69 To further this point, the European Commission’s Migration and Home Affairs website describes terrorism as “a 
menace that does not recognise borders and affects countries and people irrespective of their geographical location.” 
(Migration and Home Affairs, “Counter terrorism and radicalisation.”)  
70 Immenkamp, et al., The fight against terrorism, 4. 
71 European Union, “Counter-terrorism strategy.” 
72 Immenkamp, et al., The fight against terrorism, 4. 
73 Immenkamp, et al., 4. 
74 Committee of Experts on Terrorism, “Profiles On Counter-Terrorist Capacity: France,” 1. 
75 Committee of Experts on Terrorism, “Profiles On Counter-Terrorist Capacity: Belgium,” 3. 
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External Action Service (EEAS, the EU’s primary diplomatic arm), as well as several other 
agencies which contribute to border security, crisis management, etc., underneath it.76 
More specific issues like terrorism require more narrowly focused branches, and thus 
distinctive counterterrorism measures, offices, and positions have been created in the fight 
against international terrorism, largely since 2001. 
Since counterterrorism efforts are relatively decentralized, multiple bodies of the 
EU, as well as each member state, play a role in the generation and implementation of such 
policies. The law enforcement arm of the EU, called Europol, has established the European 
Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) as a hub of operational expertise in the field and 
investigative management upon the request of member states, and to support and 
coordinate EU regulations regarding terrorism.77 The Council mandated the creation of the 
ECTC, and has since strengthened several additional agencies in the area of justice and 
home affairs. These agencies—such as Eurojust, which deals with especially complicated 
cross-border crime involving several member states,78 Frontex, the border control 
authorities, and CEPOL, or the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training—
prioritize the prevention of terrorism as a key responsibility. The Commission’s 
Radicalization Awareness Network harmonizes efforts between the EU and member states, 
and has internal and external dimensions to comprehensively tackle the threat of terror. 
The Department of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is responsible for developing policy on 
cross-border issues, often specific to judicial and fundamental rights law, and thus plays a 
central role in establishing counterterrorism policy.79 
The position of EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was created by the Council in 
response to the March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, and is responsible for managing 
counterterrorism efforts put forth by the European Council, proposing policy 
recommendations, and monitoring the implementation of counterterrorism strategy in 
member countries.80 The Coordinator—currently Gilles de Kerchove, appointed in 2007—
 
76 European External Action Service, “About the European External Action Service (EEAS).” 
77 Europol, “European Counter Terrorism Centre – ECTC.” 
78 Eurojust - European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, “What we do.” 
79 Council of the European Union, “Justice and Home Affairs Council configuration (JHA).” 
80 Council of the European Union, “Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.” 
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proposed measures regarding FTF returnees as early as 2013, and strategic guidelines which 
included addressing FTFs were passed in mid-2014.81 The position also reports specifically 
on foreign fighters to the European Council via briefs and proposals for future work, and 
meets with countries outside of the EU to establish wide-reaching strategy.82 Additionally, 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (under the 
EEAS) oversees counterterrorism efforts alongside other issues of member state and union 
security.  
Evidently, a concerted, coordinated effort is being made across the institutions of 
the EU in order for comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategies to be 
developed and implemented. It is clear that the EU dedicates plentiful resources and labor 
to addressing the threat of terrorism within their borders and internationally. 
States may bolster EU-level policy and utilize tools the EU puts in place, as these are 
offered as common practices which states can and do incorporate into their own 
counterterrorism infrastructures. In other words, the EU is responsible for “big picture” 
regulations, and member states have authority “on the ground” to determine individual 
legislation that still abides by the EU’s rules. Two major cross-border initiatives are the 
enactment of the EU-wide Passenger Name Record system by JHA, which holds individual 
countries accountable for detecting and tracking persons who have previously traveled to 
conflict zones or are likely to for the purpose of joining jihad,83 and the Schengen 
Information System, which logs data on those entering and leaving the Schengen region.84 
Many preventative measures and large-scale collaborative work are common across 
member states, as cooperation with other states and with the EU facilitates more efficient 
and effective policy development and implementation. 
 
81 Bąkowski and Puccio, Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action, 4.  
82 Council of the European Union, “Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.” 
83 Baker-Beall, “The threat of the returning foreign fighter,” 438. 
84 According to their website, the Schengen region is the “world’s largest visa free zone.” This area includes most of 
the EU, as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein. This region has “abolished their internal borders, 
for the free and unrestricted movement of people” that remain bound by common judicial regulations. (Schengen 
Visa Info. 2021. “Schengen Area – The World’s Largest Visa Free Zone.” April 5. 
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/.) 
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Ultimately, EU-level efforts dynamically complement and support the efforts of 
member states in their responses to attacks and threats. Individual countries are able to 
propose and pass separate legislation according to their rules of governance, and also must 
abide by EU regulations that address terrorism at the supranational level, which should not 
conflict with national policy anyway. Member state and EU-level policies work 
cooperatively to provide enhanced safeguards against terrorism and actively respond to 
evolving threats.  
 
European Union- and Member State-Level Legislation on Returning FTFs  
In May 2013, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator released a report that proffered 
four distinct areas in which the EU could support the counterterrorism efforts of its 
member countries: prevention of radicalization, exchange of information regarding 
suspicious travel, criminal justice responses to returning fighters, and cooperation with 
outside countries.85 The report described the travel and return of jihadists as a “serious 
problem for European internal security” and stated that “urgent action must be taken.”86 It 
proposed twenty-two “orientations,” or guidelines, that urged several different branches 
and leadership figures in the EU to become involved in and promote counterterrorism 
measures developing at the time that addressed returnees. The measures also reiterated 
the necessity of cooperation and information sharing, and invited several agencies and 
countries (the Netherlands, Frontex, the High Representative of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, for example) to present reports on the efficacy of border controls, existing 
legislation, and “risk indicators used to detect foreign fighters.”87 During 2013, EU 
authorities solidified the issue of foreign fighters as a policy priority in response to the 
influx of Western European citizens traveling to Syria and Iraq to join jihad amidst 
uprisings and ISIS’ subsequent increase in power.88  
 
85 Scherrer, “The return of foreign fighters to EU soil,” 6. 
86 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Foreign fighters and returnees from a counter-terrorism perspective, 1. 
87 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 4. 
88 Bakker, Paulussen and Entenmann, “Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” 12. 
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In recent years, EU-level authorities have coordinated efforts between member 
states in the four areas listed above in order to more efficiently and effectively address the 
increased attention on the return of FTFs and subsequent EU-wide unease due to the 
issue.89 As stated in the “2017 Annual Report on the Implementation of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy,” the view of EU-level leaders is that “no single Member State 
alone is able to tackle the challenges we face today,” and that “common EU action” is 
needed to protect member states’ interests, a sentiment that has been evoked in conflict 
situations for decades.90 
The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in 2014 triggered an updated 
discussion in the Council of the EU as well,91 which produced a report detailing the urgency 
with which UNSCR 2178 should be implemented by states.92 Travel bans and other 
preventative protocol were put into practice within a few years; implementation of these 
acts of legislation was required of member states. However, EU policymakers never enacted 
legislation requiring the revocation of FTFs’ citizenship upon their return—such actions 
may have been thought to overstep the bounds of EU-level power and were at the discretion 
of each state. Instead, a major push for criminalization of terrorist-related travel and 
training, travel ban legislation, and border strengthening protocols was seen in many 
members states as well as in the EU as a whole.93,94 
 Member state policies on the return of foreign fighters vary, though generally fall 
into three main categories: stripping returnees of citizenship, allowing FTFs to return 
under certain conditions such as prosecution upon return, or repatriation. Figure 2 
presents simplified details of member states’ policy stances on the return of foreign fighters. 
While not a comprehensive list of all EU member state policies, these are representative 
examples of common policies implemented at the state level.  
 
 
89 Bąkowski and Puccio, “'Foreign fighters': Member States' responses and EU action in an international context,” 1. 
90 European Parliament, Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
91 Baker-Beall, “The threat of the returning foreign fighter,” 442. 
92 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Foreign fighters and returnees: discussion paper, 2. 
93 Baker-Beall, “The threat of the returning foreign fighter,” 442. 
94 Immenkamp, et al., The fight against terrorism, 7. 
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EU Member State Revocation of 
citizenship 
Repatriation Allows return with 
stipulations 
Austria * 
*Unless doing so leaves 





Belgium  * 
*Repatriates children 
 
Bulgaria   *  





*Unless doing so leaves 





Finland  * 
*Selective repatriation 
of children of fighters 
 
France   * 
*Usually detained and 
questioned upon return; 
state prefers judicial 
outsourcing to Iraq 
Germany * 
*Unless doing so leaves 
person stateless (those 
with single nationality) 
  
Italy    
Netherlands   * 
*Accept FTFs if return 
themselves 
Spain   * 
*Criminalization and 
prosecution upon return 
Sweden   * 
*Accept FTFs if return 
themselves 
UK * 
*Issues TEOs (temporary 
exclusion orders) and can 
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Figure 2. Member state-level policy regarding the return of foreign terrorist fighters from Syria and Iraq. All 
country legislation data obtained from GWU Program Report
99
 and cross-referenced with Law of Congress 
report,
100
 except Austria (see in-table citation). Additional details regarding data have been obtained from 
sources cited beside each respective data point. 
 
As demonstrated, member states are able to develop customized policy that best 
addresses the perceived needs of the country itself, taking into account the number of 
returnees, attacks that have been perpetrated by terrorists within the country, public 
opinion on the issues, and existing policy. This, in combination with EU-level policy that 
has evolved alongside member states’ authority on national security issues, makes up the 
bulk of legislative, judicial, and preventative action addressing FTFs returning to EU home 
countries.  
Here it is apparent that there is a discrepancy between the humanitarian-focused 
normative power status that the EU strives to uphold and the treatment of citizens of its 
member states. While not every state has implemented policy preventing the return of FTFs 
or revoking their citizenship, as an overarching governing body with the authority to step 
in if necessary, the EU is unexpectedly (in the context of NPE) allowing these policies to be 
enacted. This legislation appears inconsistent with the ideology portrayed in liberal 
internationalism as well as the more general standard-setting nature of the EU, which is 
indicative of alternative factors influencing the policy-making process both in the EU and 
member states. 
 
Policy Language Regarding Returnees 
The overarching approach of the EU to the general threat of terrorism and to 
returning FTFs more specifically is to emphasize the physical threat, according to 
Christopher Baker-Beall’s assessment of the security situation revolving around returning 
FTFs, which highlights the urgency of the matter and possibly extreme measures to which 
governing bodies may turn in order to protect citizens from danger posed by extremist 
 
99 Hoffman and Furlan, “Challenges Posed by Returning Foreign Fighters,” 16-19. 
100 Global Legal Research Center, Treatment of Foreign Fighters in Selected Jurisdictions, 10. 
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actors.101 Imperative in any examination of the legitimacy of existing policy is the specific 
language used in the legislation itself. Along with aggressive measures to keep former FTFs 
out of the country or at least be prosecuted if allowed in, language used in the legislation 
iterates a sense of physical danger posed by these returnees. Threat of physical attack is 
frequently listed first as a reason for implementation of certain policy. More intangible 
threats, such as radicalization and proliferating jihadist ideology, are often lower on the list 
of concerns addressed by policy. A few representative examples of policy language are 
provided below.  
An illustrative example of attack-focused policy language is found in the four pillars 
of The Counter-Terrorism Agenda of the EU, published in 2020: anticipate, respond, 
protect, and prevent.102 The first three are aimed at physical threat detection, threat 
assessment, prosecution, protection of critical infrastructure, and restriction of weapons. 
Prevention touches upon the underlying causes of radicalization, such as online content 
and networking, but is overshadowed by the stress on physical attack. This 
disproportionate emphasis is indicative of attack-focused policy priorities. 
  In a 2019 briefing before the European Parliament, the European Parliamentary 
Research Service presented current data on the fight against terrorism. In the section 
entitled “State of Play,” the authors list groups of terrorist actors that pose a threat to EU 
member states. First on this list are FTFs, described using the following language103: 
  
With the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State (ISIL/Da'esh), thousands 
of young Europeans left for conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to fight for 
ISIL/Da'esh. Some of them came back to organise and carry out deadly 
attacks on European soil, such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris. 
 
Evidently, threat of physical attack is the foremost concern pertaining to the return 
of FTFs. The Global Counterterrorism Forum, of which the EU is part, produced “The 
 
101 Baker-Beall, “The threat of the returning foreign fighter,” 438. 
102 European Union, “A Counter-Terrorism Agenda For The EU,” 1-4. 
103 Immenkamp, et al., The fight against terrorism, 2. 
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Hague–Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the 
FTF Phenomenon” in 2014. In the second paragraph of the nine-page report, the authors 
sought to describe the threat posed by returning FTFs, using the following language104 
(emphasis added): 
 
Subsequent to their return, whether operating independently (“lone actors”) 
or as a part of a group, there is a risk that FTFs can commit terrorist acts or 
promote violence, provide guidance and operational expertise, raise funds, 
and/or serve as recruiters to radicalize and more broadly encourage others to 
violence in their State of residence or nationality… 
 
Once again, perpetration of terrorist acts is the first concern noted. The 2020 
Counter-Terrorism Agenda referenced above also contains attack-centered language in 
addition to the focus of the four main security pillars. In the second paragraph of the 
Introduction to this 25-page agenda, the following statement is made regarding the broad 
threat of terrorism, specifically the “jihadist threat from or inspired by Daesh, al-Qaeda and 
their affiliates,” and the EU’s role in countering extremism and protecting its citizens from 
attack105 (emphasis added): 
 
The recent spate of attacks on European soil have served as a sharp reminder 
that terrorism remains a real and present danger. As this threat evolves, so 
too must our cooperation to counter it…Citizens have the right to feel safe in 
their own homes and streets, as well as on the internet. The EU has a key role 
to play in helping to deliver that security. 
 
This emphasis on recent attacks, the most recent of which was in 2016, suggests not 
only that the threat of violent attack has remained, but also that mitigating this risk should 
 
104 Global Counterterrorism Forum, The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices, 1. 
105 European Commission, “A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU,” 1. 
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be the number-one priority in counterterrorism policy. This weighting appears highly 
disproportionate when discussed alongside data on physical attacks (discussed in the 
following section), implying that other factors are at play in policy making. In other words, 
the aggressiveness of policy aimed at deterring physical attacks on home soil is suggestive 
of multiple factors influencing the EU policy-making process, since it appears 
disproportionate to the data concerning the prevalence of such attacks. 
 These examples of policy language reflect what appears to be the most salient 
concern in policy-makers’ minds: the physical threat of attack by FTFs on home soil. While 
certainly a relevant and pressing concern, should it be framed in a way that diminishes the 
relative importance of other issues, as seen in these policy examples? Next, I present data 
on physical attacks perpetrated by FTFs who have returned to their home countries, 
drawing on empirical figures to answer the question of whether this policy emphasis is 
completely justified by the violent actions of returned FTFs. 
 
FTF-Perpetrated Attacks 
 Here I summarize available data on the threat of physical attack perpetrated on the 
soil of a returnee’s home country against fellow citizens. It has proven difficult for scholars 
and policymakers alike to obtain accurate data regarding the background of some 
perpetrators, and thus what is presented is not an exhaustive list or complete interpretation 
of all FTF-executed attacks. Despite this, some conclusions can be drawn from the data 
available at this time regarding FTF returnees from Syria and attacks directed, inspired, or 
claimed by ISIS. 
 Between 1993 (the first US World Trade Center bombing) and the end of 2018, there 
were 124 radical Islamist terrorist attacks on people and infrastructure in countries 
considered Western, both geographically compared to the Middle Eastern region and 
ideologically as assessed by many in the Muslim faith.106 Most attacks during these 25 years 
were directly planned and executed or inspired by al Qaeda; I will focus on the more recent 
 
106 All data in this section, unless denoted by an additional superscript, were compiled by E. Pokalova. Further 
interpretation and percentages are the work of the author. (Pokalova, Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters, 
Appendix). 
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wave of returnees from the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as these are the issues to which EU 
and member state policy initiatives are most explicitly responding. Thus, out of the 93 
attacks concluded by authorities to have been planned or executed by Islamic extremists 
and that occurred in 2014 or later, 6 (or 6.45%) involved returned FTFs who had 
participated with ISIS abroad or were otherwise inspired by the group. 
The Jewish Museum shooting in Brussels, Belgium on May 24, 2014 was the first 
attack on European soil to be carried out by a foreign terrorist fighter who had returned 
from Syria. Mehdi Nemmouche, a French national,107 was directed by ISIS to execute the 
attack, which killed four people. An attack on the Thalys train traveling in France on August 
21, 2015 was the next attack by a Syria returnee, and thankfully no fatalities occurred. The 
perpetrator, Ayoub El Khazzani, was also directed by ISIS to carry out the assault; however, 
Khazzani was a Moroccan national and not a citizen of the EU, but was reportedly living in 
Brussels at the time of the attack after extensive travel throughout Europe.108 Deadly attacks 
in Paris (counted in this analysis as one incident due to the events being perpetrated by 
one group operating in multiple locations in the city) on November 13, 2015 involved seven 
Syria returnees, most of whom were French or Belgian citizens (two were Iraqi),109 and was 
again ISIS-directed. The largest of these FTF attacks in terms of fatalities, the shootings and 
suicide bombings left 130 people dead.110 Three coordinated attacks (again counted as one 
incident for the aforementioned reason) on the Brussels airport and nearby Maalbeek 
Metro station happened on March 22, 2016, resulting in 32 civilian deaths as well as 3 
attackers, all Belgian nationals.111 Yet again, ISIS members directly influenced the Syria 
returnees to perpetrate the violence.112  
Though not perpetrated by Syria returnees, in the following year, two attacks 
occurred in the UK, both committed by returnees from Libya. The Manchester Arena 
 
107 BBC, “Brussels Jewish Museum murders: Mehdi Nemmouche jailed for life.” 
108 Bittermann and Jones, “France train attack: What we know about suspect Ayoub El Khazzani?” 
109 BBC, “Paris attacks: Who were the attackers?” 
110 BBC, “Paris attacks: What happened on the night.”  
111 DW Akademie, “Brussels terror attacks: 10 people to stand trial over 2016 bombings.” 
112 Had all of these events been considered separate attacks, FTF-perpetrated attacks would totaled 13 (6 in Paris in 
2015). This means that 14% of terrorist-perpetrated attacks between 2014-2018 were committed by returned FTFs. 
The percentage of individual returned FTFs who perpetrated violent attacks remains the same as reported above.  
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bombing and London Bridge car explosion are the most recent attacks by returned FTFs in 
the EU. Though these perpetrators had returned from the Libyan conflict zone rather than 
Syria, ISIS claimed both attacks, and the perpetrators were EU nationals (both from the 
UK), so they are included in this analysis.113,114 
 If all of the approximately 1,500 FTFs who traveled and fought in the Syrian conflict 
and then returned to the EU could be designated a jihadist and thus a foreign terrorist 
fighter, these attacks involved a total of 14, or 0.93%, of them (this figure includes the two 
Libya returnees). This “blowback rate,” defined by Hegghammer as the proportion of 
fighters who return to their home country and plan and execute attacks there, is the 
concern of EU member states, despite it being “very low indeed,” or lower than one would 
imagine when considering the number of foreign fighters, their violent histories, and the 
anticipations of some policymakers and analysts in recent years.115 Interestingly, this 
important figure is not highlighted in policy rhetoric; rather, vague language defining the 
“threat” appears to suffice. 
 Returned FTFs are also spread across the entire EU, not just in these countries where 
attacks occurred, which further emphasizes the difference in the rate of violent attacks by 
FTFs compared to those committed by member state citizens who are not associated with 
terrorist traveling. As of 2017, FTFs had returned to 11 countries in the EU sample presented, 
but FTF-perpetrated attacks occurred in only 3 of these states. Thus, the rate of violent FTF 
attack in 8 countries is zero, compared to a non-zero violent crime rate in all of these 
countries. 
 In comparison with this rate of violence by returned FTFs, aggregate violent crime 
rates from 2018 (which include intentional homicide, assault, sexual violence, rape, and 
sexual assault) committed by nationals in the three countries in which FTF-perpetrated 
attacks occurred are as follows: 0.693% in Belgium, 0.513% in France, and 1.403% in the 
UK.116 These rates are not considerably different from the rate of violent attack by returnees, 
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which may supplement the argument that there is not an exceptional danger posed by 
returnees when compared to that already seen in home countries. 
Additionally, the recidivism rates of criminal offenders, both violent and nonviolent, 
in several EU member states can be compared to the blowback rate of returnees, as these 
repeat offenders had previously been convicted of a crime, which can be likened to the 
history of FTFs abroad as a “first conviction.” Based on data from 2005 and reported in 2015, 
recidivism rates within a two-year period are as follows: Denmark, 29%; Finland, 36%; 
Norway, 20%; Sweden, 43%; and Northern Ireland, 47%. More recent member state data, 
collected in 2013, shows that Ireland has a rate of 51% in a three-year span, and the UK has 
a rate of 45% in just one year.117 Thus, even when partitioning violent versus nonviolent 
reoffenders represented by these statistics, the blowback rate of terrorist offenders who 
have returned from conflict zones abroad remains contextually low, which further supports 
the notion that there is an overstated response by the EU to the physical threat of returnees.  
 
A Potential Mismatch Between Stated Policy Motivations and Threat 
Altogether, these data suggest that an additional consideration is involved in 
decision- and policy-making at both the EU- and state-level, as language used in such 
policy is disproportionately focused on the physical threat and highly contrasts the factual 
threat indicated by the data. By juxtaposing policy language and number of physical attacks 
perpetrated by returnees, it becomes clear that there is a mismatch between the threat 
suggested by aggressive policy wording and the threat of attack as backed by data. Such 
emphasis on this threat, potentially at the expense of focus on other, more dangerous 
threats (radicalization, fundraising, etc.), suggests that there is another underlying element 
in the response to returning FTFs that manifests in an outwardly strong fear of physical 
attack and disproportionate emphasis on prevention of this act. 
Certainly, the time of publication of such EU reports matters—as we progress 
farther from the incidence of attack, the more unnecessary a primary focus on physical 
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attack appears. Reports from 2014 to 2018 (the year of the first EU attack and the year after 
the last confirmed returnee-perpetrated attack, respectively) have a more significant 
purpose in highlighting this risk, but more recent reports may do better to highlight other 
risk factors at play in the return of FTFs since the prevalence of this threat has not 
manifested as once expected.  
Concluding the presence of this mismatch is certainly not meant to discount or 
underestimate the physical and mortal damage returnees are capable of doing. A single 
attack is too many, and the value of human life cannot be defined in these terms. The 
potential of a physical attack undoubtedly warrants policy implementation to prevent this 
from occurring. However, security scholars like Thomas Renard assert that this danger 
should not be “overstated…[but] not underestimated either”118—there is risk in both. Thus,  
in addition to the threat of physical attack, I propose that there is another reason for 
member states’ and the EU’s forceful responses. Framing the return of FTFs as a physical 
threat can be explained as an ontological security response by the EU in order to protect the 
institution’s and member states’ sense of “self” and identity when facing the return of FTFs. 
 
The Ontological Security Threat of Returnees 
How can it be that the EU, a supranational organization devoted to promoting 
democratic values as a normative power in the global community, has developed policies 
that turn its own citizens into stateless persons beyond the protection of its laws? I propose 
that this drift from typical “NPE-approved” policy is a response to an existential insecurity 
caused by the return of FTFs to EU member states. These FTFs were, and still are, citizens 
of the EU, and thus shared in the collective identity. Do they still share this identity, or has 
it changed based on their decision to leave and their experiences abroad? How can they as 
individuals threaten the stability of the identity of the EU, a massive transnational 
institution? These are essential questions for understanding the response of the EU to the 
return of FTFs, and the answers may lie in the process by which the EU navigates threats 
to its identity. 
 
118 Renard, “How to handle returning foreign fighters: policies and challenges,” 1. 
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This section summarizes background knowledge on the nature of ontological 
security in international politics and the concept of securitization theory. These ideas and 
how they are manifested within the security sphere of the EU provide the conceptual 
framework for my argument. I argue that the EU has securitized the issue of returning FTFs 
and thus its response is not subject to typical democratic oversight of normal politics. I also 
specify the reasoning behind my argument that ontological insecurity is an underlying 
factor in the EU’s response to the return of FTFs (securitization), and that this concept 
provides a potential explanation for the disproportionate reaction to the threat this group 
poses. 
 
Ontological (In)security and Securitization Theories 
Ontological security is a budding concept in international relations; it has become 
more popular in recent years as scholars use it to describe the security-seeking behavior of 
states in a theoretical way that involves “security not of the body but of the self,”119 which 
has not previously been deeply investigated in this field. The concept was originally used 
to describe the internal, psychological sentiment of individuals facing the “hazards of life” 
and dealing with these issues with a firm sense of his or her own identity and the identities 
of others.120 Depending on an individual’s sense of security in his or her own identity and 
sense of self and place in the world, though, anxieties and dangers may not be dealt with 
appropriately. It has been proposed that states also experience this sense of agency, and 
participate in security-seeking behaviors in order to establish and maintain their identities 
relative to others.121 States may suffer existential anxiety similarly to individuals when 
instability is introduced into the established relations between actors, or when a state’s 
own sense of identity is threatened with volatility and uncertainty.  
Ontological security, and in turn identity stability, is a constant, basic need both for 
individuals and for states. An essential component of identity constancy is that it can be 
sustained by the state’s actions indefinitely. Amidst change in relations with other actors 
 
119 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” 344. 
120 Laing, The Divided Self, 39. 
121 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” 342. 
 30 
or threats to the state, chosen actions will either “reproduce or contradict” identity, and 
thus identity continually influences the response of a state, which is a logical conclusion.122 
Figure 3 provides a visualization for this process of identity and its interaction with the 
response of the state to other actors. 
 
influences… 
Identity  Action 
sustains… 
Figure 3. Graphic representation of the “dynamic process” of identity. Adapted from Mitzen, “Ontological 
Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” 344. 
 
Change inherently disrupts the stability of an established routine. Ontological 
insecurity in a state, then, is caused by fluctuations and uncertainty in relationships with 
“significant others”—because identity is “formed and sustained through relationships”123—
and the subsequent upheaval (or threatened upheaval) of state identity. According to 
Mitzen, this refers to the “deep, incapacitating state” of uncertainty regarding whether or 
not to confront or ignore different dangers.124 The state’s sense of agency is in turmoil; there 
is a lack of confidence in the path forward when dealing with threats to security, ideology, 
etc. When uncertainty persists and “an actor has no idea what to expect,” doubt reigns in 
decisions on how to address the future.125 Identity, while it should guide action, is not 
helpful now, which perpetuates the uncertainty felt. Logically, actors attempt to mitigate 
these uncertainties and regain a sense of stability in their identities, their relationships, and 
their sense of place within the world.  
If states can be posited as seekers of ontological security, so too can the EU, which 
is an important actor on the world stage. The EU experiences ontological stressors in many 
ways, such as economic downturns, migration issues, and the rise of far-right ideology to 
name a few, despite its purpose of maintaining a collective identity.126 The organization has 
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appropriately been deemed an “anxious community” in today’s world because of these 
threats to cohesion and identity and subsequent response by the EU.127 These threats cause 
ontological anxiety by introducing uncertainty into how to proceed in mitigating the 
negative effects of such issues, which may not be adequately addressed with previous 
methods, thus challenging the sense of identity and competency typically upheld by the 
EU. 
The need for a stable identity is often amplified in times of uncertainty or times 
during which potentially threatening circumstances, such as the unpredictable return of 
FTFs, are beyond the control of the state.128 One way states try to alleviate the stress of 
uncertainty is through “securitization.” Securitization theory in the field of international 
relations refers, at its most fundamental level, to the process by which security threats are 
defined as such by governing authorities. According to the theory, the focuses of national 
security policy are “not a natural given,” but rather are called into being by those in power 
in a state or organization.129 Security issues are based largely on a perceived need to 
heighten the response to or awareness of a particular threat, essentially moving the issue 
into a special categorization of “existential threat.”130  
The process of securitization is diagrammed in Figure 4. An issue is framed as a 
security threat by an actor, often a government figure or other authoritative group or 
individual with stakes in the security of the state or institution. This framing is portrayed 
to an audience relevant to the actor; i.e., if the securitizing actor is part of a government, 
her audience may be other members of the parliamentary body or the general public. At 
this point, the audience must “accept” the framing of the issue as a security threat, so that 
the move towards securitization may continue in a tangible, policy-based way.131 
Securitization theory has provided a framework for empirical analyses of how political 
actors gain the ability to place certain security issues “on the docket,” so to speak.132  
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Figure 4. Outline of the process of securitization. Cycle graphic adapted from Sjöstedt, “Securitization 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.” 
 
The intersubjective nature of these security decisions intensifies unavoidable 
imbalances in power dynamics between actors. For example, policy implemented as a result 
of the “War on Terror” launched by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 asserted that 
terrorism was a global threat and designated essentially the entire Muslim community a 
“dangerous Other” in the eyes of the US and many other nations.133 This exemplifies one 
major facet of securitization: the labeling of an “Other” to further divide “them” from “us.” 
An “Other” could viably be another state, a material object, or a group of substate actors; 
in other words, it can be defined as whatever the referent object (i.e., the actor whose 
existence is being protected; in this case, the EU) deems threatening. This distinction 
contributes to the justification of securitizing an issue, almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy 
in the way that “if we define ‘them’ as a security threat and as being unlike ‘us,’ they will be 
more easily viewed as a valid danger, resulting in their actions becoming more worthy of 
our aggressive response.” The imbalance created by an us-versus-them mindset leads to 
shifted power relations between the securitizing actors and the securitized object, creating 
a rift that further exacerbates the issue. 
 














Another major facet of securitization is the validated use of “extraordinary 
measures” to tackle security threats. When the government of a member state or the EU 
designates a threat, resources can readily be allocated toward designing policy and making 
maneuvers to alleviate it.134 That is to say, securitization justifies or rationalizes an increase 
in state power and a parallel decrease in democratic norms, often through the 
authorization of actions which in normal circumstances may be “deemed undemocratic.” 
Guantanamo Bay and the use of torture, disregard for citizen privacy in the name of 
surveillance, and the incidence of abnormally indiscriminate drone strikes are recognizable 
and illustrative examples of intensified US policy measures that resulted from the 
securitization of terrorism. Exceptions to typical protocol and adoption of extreme means 
exemplify the extraordinary nature of the threat and suggest an instability felt by the state 
in their own existence, which is threatened by the existence of the “Other.” In sum, state 
reactions to perceived threats under the umbrella of securitization usually suspend typical 
action-planning and err on the side of excess as opposed to overly conservative, in an effort 
to avoid this existential anxiety.135 
Securitization plays an important role in the preservation of European normative 
power. The stable identity of the EU is incredibly important in dealing with other countries, 
as it must have a firm set of values and principles with which to define its relationships 
with others. As ontological insecurity grows, states attempt to “securitize subjectivity” in 
an effort to further control uncertainty and search for a singular stable identity.136 In other 
words, states desire to take all subjectivity, or guesswork or uncertainty, out of the threat 
they are facing. This process involves a reinvigorated attempt to confirm identity traits 
within the state or organization, leading to a more comfortable definition of self and a 
“juxtaposition of these [traits] to others’ [traits].”137 Again, an “Other” must be continually 
defined in response to changing threats. 
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It is interesting to note here that migration is not necessarily seen as a physical 
threat to EU or member state security, but is still a securitized issue, further evidence that 
there need not be an overwhelming physical threat element in securitization. The EU 
presents a unique case of a relatively long history of peace within the region paralleled by 
constantly experiencing stressors both within and outside of its borders.138 Still, with the 
increase of ontological insecurity comes the increase in the use of securitization as a means 
of mitigating potential threats with overwhelming measures. This may contribute to the 
EU’s ability to maintain political and militaristic peace within its borders and in its dealings 
with many other countries. 
In short, the process of securitization occurs via the framing of a perceived threat as 
a security issue by authoritative actors, followed by the acceptance of this designation by 
the relevant audience. This opens the possibility for extreme measures to be taken to 
address the securitized threat, often leading to a suspension of typical democratic means 
of national security. Securitization plays a large role in the development and modification 
of identity within a state or supranational institution. The issues a government chooses to 
securitize delineate its relationships with other actors in the world, and for the EU, 
reaffirms its place as a normative power. 
These concepts of ontological security and securitization offer a potential answer to 
the question of how EU identity may be threatened by powers much weaker than the 
supranational institution and why it responds with such force. Securitization is one factor 
in EU identity continuity, as it perpetuates definitions of “us” and “Other” that are 
imperative in stabilizing a potentially threatened group identity. It also importantly 
decreases the ontological insecurity felt in times of uncertainty and rationalizes the use of 
extraordinary means to do so. This will be unpacked in the final section alongside the 
conclusion of my argument that ontological security is an underlying factor invoked in 
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Returning FTFs: An Existential Threat to the Ontological Insecurity of the EU 
I propose that ontological insecurity is caused in EU member states and, in turn, the 
EU as an institution, by the return of FTFs. Foreign terrorist fighters returning to their 
home countries after fighting jihad in Syria or other Middle Eastern countries are labeled 
as the “Other,” or even the “Stranger-other,”139 because of their potentially misplaced 
identity resulting from their time and purpose abroad.  
 Leduc states that FTFs challenge the “conventional notion” of the relationship 
between EU authority and EU citizens and thus generate instability surrounding the 
“fundamental understanding of state authority.”140 In other words, it is possible that 
authorities no longer feel stable in their roles, since these citizens demonstrate through 
their actions that they may no longer respect the authority of the EU. This captures the 
roots of the ontological insecurity dilemma that is produced when FTFs attempt to return 
home. This friction creates discomfort on the part of the EU and member state 
governments, and policies are designed in order to address this. However, feelings of 
ontological insecurity are not often consciously considered; rather, seeking security is an 
unconscious, ongoing process.141 Therefore, I have proposed that the aggressive, physical-
attack focused rhetoric of EU and member state policies is a sort of coping mechanism that 
indirectly addresses the ontological insecurity the EU possesses in this situation without 
using that precise language.  
In my view, this insecurity would be more openly demonstrated by policies aimed 
at dissuading further radicalization of individuals in home states at the hands of returnees, 
rather than policies focused on physical attack, as the former addresses the intangible 
instability that could be caused by their return. While policy rhetoric focusing on this 
relatively intangible threat does exist, these policies are not the foremost concern of the 
EU, as demonstrated previously, further suggesting that it may be simpler to address 
physical security concerns as opposed to the intangible, not-fully-understood nature of 
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ontological insecurity in the EU. Thus, one of the reasons behind aggressive physical 
attack-focused policy against returnees may be this sense of insecurity, though it is not 
typically referenced as a motivating factor.  
The maxim “never again” has been noted as a particularly relevant narrative of the 
EU, in response to past human rights abuses; however, policy against the return of FTFs 
has been described as such a modern-day abuse.142 The revocation of citizenship, while 
ultimately not leaving individuals stateless, appears to be a contradiction against the 
ideology of the EU as imposing humanitarian norms on the rest of the world. The ethical 
dimension of this issue is not the focus of this analysis, but this factor seems also to 
contribute to a sense of anxiety and tension between (1) normative power of the EU and its 
commitment to human rights and (2) the fear of attack if FTFs were permitted to return—
a tension which could realistically and legitimately induce ontological insecurity. This 
extreme response that directly challenges one of the core tenets of EU ideology is highly 
indicative of such existential insecurity. 
 
Conclusion 
The recent phenomenon of FTFs returning to their home countries presented the 
EU, as well as other nations worldwide, with an unprecedented security challenge. Policy 
decisions centered largely around the physical, tangible threat of such individuals who left 
their home countries and traveled to commit jihad in conflict zones like Syria and Iraq. 
However, I have demonstrated that there is a mismatch between the realized threat of 
physical attack by returned FTFs, as shown in empirical attack data, and the heightened 
threat perception suggested by EU policy rhetoric dealing with the return of these 
individuals. This implies additional underlying factors in such policy decisions. Based on 
the information presented in this paper, it seems as if we cannot fully understand the 
phenomenon of FTFs or improve the EU’s and member states’ responses without 
understanding the reasoning behind securitization and the impact of ontological insecurity 
on the authority of the state.  
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Securitizing the issue of returning FTFs allows legislators within the EU to employ 
extreme measures to tackle the threat. As a security-seeking actor, the EU strives to avoid 
uncertainty, so that the identity of the governing institution and the union as a whole 
remains stable and consistent. I argue that returning FTFs produce anxiety; they are both 
a citizen and an “Other,” the latter of which is an existential threat that challenges the EU’s 
self-identity as a normative power. The EU’s policy response is reflective of its experience 
of ontological insecurity, though it manifests through indirect aggression rather than 
explicitly evoking insecurity as a reason behind the decisions made. 
The recognition of ontological insecurity as a result of the presence and subsequent 
securitization of returning FTFs is vital and can provide a more comprehensive perception 
of the EU response to not only this security threat but to related issues like domestic 
terrorism, ex-prisoners, and migration-related security matters. However, looking solely at 
ontological insecurity certainly cannot account for the EU’s entire response. Rather, it is a 
crucial factor in the holistic picture of the security response to FTFs. I chose to address this 
aspect in my paper because it is largely absent in the literature surrounding FTFs returning 
to the EU, but there is evidence to support the hypothesis of its influence on related policy. 
On the other hand, some policy reports do stress ontological insecurity as a factor, though 
without referencing the exact term because, as mentioned, ontological security-seeking 
behavior is chiefly subconscious. One example found in an ex-post evaluation of the 
response to FTFs published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in 2018 stated 
the following143: 
 
First, they are perceived as a security threat. During their stay in conflict 
zones, they acquire combat experience, which prompts fears that they may 
perpetuate the terrorist threat to the EU through radicalising, fundraising 
and facilitation activities. 
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The mention of radicalization, financing, and other facilitation activities as 
the primary fears resulting from FTFs’ return suggests a more upfront 
acknowledgement that there is more than a physical threat. Highlighting these 
threats as opposed to physical threat may be indicative of ontological insecurity 
being generated, though a thorough exploration of the reasoning behind such 
rhetoric would need to be done in a subsequent study in order to come to such a 
conclusion. In addition to this investigation, follow-up analyses may be done once 
data has been released on the effects of the aforementioned policies on both the 
home country population and the FTFs affected by it. Also, generation of ontological 
insecurity in citizens living in EU member states could be assessed to determine the 
level of comfort and stability offered by these governmental policies. Ultimately, 
only time will tell whether these policies are effective in addressing the security 
issues presented by returnees, both physical and ontological. Until that point, a 
more thorough understanding of the significant role ontological security plays in 
the securitization of such issues is imperative. This paper provides a first attempt at 
such an understanding. 
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